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THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF SEA PIRATES: WILL
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
DECISIONS GET MORE KILLED?
BARRY HART DUBNER*
BRIAN OTERO**
I. INTRODUCTION

The tide of piracy off the coast of Somalia has ebbed according to
recent statistics.' Perhaps it is just in time. Three decisions involving
pirates, who were found to be deprived of their human rights by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Mauritius and a Danish law,
are rather troubling in at least two different ways: (1) These decisions set
pirates free after they were brought to justice; and (2), which is more
problematic, pirates may now be subject to summary execution because of
frustrated governments and innocent seafarers. This Article will explore
these three recent decisions and then put them into context with (a) what
has been happening historically with sea piracy off the coast of Somalia
(an 1,800-mile coastline); 2 and (b) the reason for the current decline in the
* Barry Hart Dubner, Professor of Law, Barry University, Andreas School of Law, Orlando,
Florida; J.D., New York Law School; LL.M., University of Miami, School of Law; LL.M., New York
University School of Law; J.S.D., New York University School of Law.
** Brian Otero, Lead Article Editor, Barry Law Review, 2014-2015; J.D. (2016), Barry
University Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law; B.A. Political Science (2013), Barry University.
1. ICC INT'L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS-2014 ANNUAL
REPORT 29 (Jan. 2015), available at http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/
01/2014-Annual-IMB-Piracy-Report-ABRIDGED.pdf [hereinafter PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY
AGAINST SHIPS]. The figures represented in the IMB report show "a continued and welcome decrease
in reported attacks for the fourth consecutive year." Id. Your authors would like to thank the IMB for
their statistics, which have been most helpful and utilized throughout this Article.
2. Robert 1. Rotberg, Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for
Action, in WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION (2010), available at http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/
files/WPFPolicyBriefnol I RotbergMaritimePiracy.pdf [hereinafter Combating Maritime Piracy].
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number of acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia. A recommendation will
be made concerning the trying of pirates aboard a United Nations (UN)
sanctioned vessel. The question is whether any country will want to go
through the time and expense of bringing these pirates back to their
homelands for justice. A further question is whether more pirates will be
killed as a result of these decisions.
The ECHR recently decided the cases of Ali Samatar and Others v.
France3 and Hassanand Others v. France.4 The ECHR held unanimously,
in two separate instances, that nine Somali nationals (pirates) who
hijacked French registered vessels off the 1800 mile coast of Somalia; and
who were later arrested, held by the French army, transferred to France,
taken into police custody, and subsequently tried as pirates under French
law; should be released and given compensation in thousands of Euros.5
Looking at the facts of Ali Samatarand Others v. France, the pirates were
prosecuted in France for acts of piracy resulting from an attack on a cruise
ship flying a French flag.6 A dozen men armed with assault rifles and
rocket launchers intercepted the cruise ship.7 These men seized the cruise
ship, took its crew of thirty (including twenty French nationals), and
headed to the Somali coast.8 As a reaction to these acts of piracy, the
French government persuaded the Somali Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) to authorize the French to enter into Somali territorial
waters in order to take all necessary measures-including appropriate use
of force. 9 The French hostages0 were released on April 11, 2008, seven
days after the initial hijacking. '
Once the pirates were detained, the Somali authorities apparently gave
their permission to fly the prisoners to France." The prisoners were

3. Ali Samatar and Others v. France, (Judgment), App. No. 17110/10 and 17301/10, Er. 2014
Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-148290#
{"itemid":["001-148290"]}.
4. Hassan and Others v. France, (Judgment), App. No. 46695/10 and 54588/10, Eru.2014 Eur.
H.R. available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["hassanandothersv.france"],
Ct.
"languageisocode":["FRE"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAM BER","CHAM BER"],"itemid"
:["001-148289"]}.

5. Press Release, Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, Suspects of Piracy Against
French Vessels, Apprehended in Somalia by the French Authorities, Should Have Been Brought
Before a Legal Authority as Soon as They Arrived in France, Apr. 12, 2014 (on file with author)
[hereinafter Suspects of PiracyAgainst French Vessels].
6. Ali Samatarand Others, supra note 3.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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transported on a military aircraft that departed on April 15 at 3 p.m. and
landed in France at around 5:15 p.m. on April 16.12 Once the prisoners
landed, they were taken into police custody on April 16.13 On the morning
of April 18, they were taken before an investigating judge and placed
under judicial investigation.1 4 Going into further detail, the investigation
division of the Paris Court of Appeals discussed the events leading to their
arrest in Somali territory and their detention; and held, in ajudgment dated
April 6, 2009, that the proceedings were lawful. 5 After exhausting their
appeals in the French courts, the applicants appealed to the ECHR, which
held unanimously that there was a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
European Convention of Human Rights. 16

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Suspects of Piracy Against French Vessels, supra note 5. Article 5 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) states:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a
court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence
or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing
after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or
his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry
into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation
or extradition.
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands,
of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph I (c) of this
Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.
Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions
of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 5, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
ConventionENG.pdf [hereinafter Convention for the Protection of Human Rights].
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Regarding the companion French case of Hassan and Others, there
were three Somali nationals, whose years of birth were given apparently to
show that they were of age.' 7 They were prosecuted in France for acts of
piracy committed in 2008.18 On September 2, 2008, the three pirates
intercepted Carr d'As, a French yacht. 19 The three pirates obliged the
crew and a French couple to change course in order to join their other
vessels.2° Once they joined the other vessels, about ten pirates boarded the
yacht, which reached the coast of Somalia that evening. 2 The couple were
robbed of their possessions and then held hostage for two million dollars.22
On September 5, a French naval frigate arrived on the scene with a team of
commandos.
Abiding by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816,24 the
French naval frigate carried out its attack on September 16.25 Once the
operation to free the hostages commenced and the pirates were arrested,
the pirates were in Somali territorial water. 26 After their arrest, the pirates
were placed under military guard on the French naval frigate. 27 They were
held on board until September 22, 2008.28 After the Somali authorities
agreed on September 21 to the transfer of the six Somali suspects, the
applicants were then taken to a Djibouti military base pending their
transfer to France on September 21.29 They were put on a military plane on
September 23, 2008 and arrived in France on the same day at around 4
p.m. ° The crux of the human rights problem, as far as the ECHR was
concerned, was that they were held in police custody until September 25 at
2:30 p.m. Later on September 25, one of the suspected pirates was brought

17.

Hassan and Others, supra note 4.

18. Id.
19. Id.

20. Id.
21.

Id.

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. S.C. Res. 1816, par. 20-22, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1816 (June 2, 2008). On June 2, 2008, the

United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution (1816), which authorized (for a six-month period)
States, that wished to cooperate with the Somali TFG in the fight against piracy and armed robbery off
of the cost of Somalia, to enter Somali's territorial waters and use all available means to repel acts of
piracy and armed robbery. Id. In fact, the resolution was interpreted to allow affected governments to
go on land and use Somali's territorial waters as well. Suspects of Piracy Against French Vessels,
supra note 5.
25. Hassan and Others, supra note 4.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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before an investigating judge in the afternoon at 5:54 pm. 3 1 The other two
suspects were brought before an investigating judge at 7:30 p.m. and 8:09
p.m. the same day.32
An examining judge placed them under judicial investigation and
remanded them back into custody.33 The French court specifically held
that their arrest and detention, pending placement in police custody, had
not breached Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
That court reached its decision due to the "wholly exceptional
circumstances" of the case in temporal and geographic terms. 34 The
appellate court, the Court of Cassation, dismissed the applications on
appeal. 35 The prisoners ultimately filed complaints with the ECHR. 36 The
ECHR held unanimously, that there had been:
a violation of Article 5 1 (a right to liberty and security) of the
European Convention of Human Rights in the case of Hassan and
Others because the French system applicable at the relevant time
had not sufficiently guaranteed the applicants' rights to their liberty
... a violation of Article 5 3 (right to liberty and security) in both
cases, as the applicants had been taken into custody for forty-eight
hours on their arrivals and in France instead of being brought
"promptly" before a legal authority when they have already been
deprived of their liberty for four days and some twenty hours (Ali
Samatar and Others) and six days and sixteen hours (Hassan and
Others).37
The court, in its opinion, reiterated that the purpose of Article 5 3 is to
facilitate the detection of any ill treatment and to minimize any unjustified
interference with individual liberty. This is done in order to protect
individuals by means of an automatic initial review within a strict time
frame that leaves little flexibility in interpretation.38 The court cited
precedential cases that delineated the Article 5
3 promptness
requirement; those cases allowed for a period of two to three days between

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. Only three of the six suspected pirates brought suit before the ECHR. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. §§ 23-24.
Id.
Suspects of Piracy Against French Vessels, supra note 5. Article 5 of the ECHR, supra note

38. Id.
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a defendant's arrest and initial court appearance. 39 The Article was not
designed to give the authorities the opportunity to intensify investigations
40
for the purpose of bringing formal charges against the suspects.
The ECHR awarded damages in both cases. The EHCR awarded
C5,000 in the case of Hassan and Others as non-pecuniary damage and
E7,272.46 to Abdulhai Guelleh Ahmed for costs and expenses. 4' In Ali
Samatar and Others the ECHR gave C2,000 to each of the applicants as
non-pecuniary damages and for costs and expenses. 42 The ECHR also gave
an award of C9,000 to Abdurahman Ali Samatar, together with E6,000
jointly to Ismael Ali Samatar et al and £3,000 to Abdulqader Guled Said.43
Much of the criticism of the EHCR decision concerns the fact that the
ECHR apparently added insult to injury by awarding thousands of Euros
to the pirates after they had received a two-million-Euro ransom in order
to release the hostages. 44 However, at least two of the defendants were
found not guilty by the French court but only after having been held in
custody for four years with the others arrested.45 These innocent men were
taken into custody after leaving the port in some vehicle, but they were
never proven to have been aboard the cruise ship on which the acts of
piracy were perpetrated.4 6
In Police v Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader and Others,47 a case decided
prior to Hassan in December 2014, the twelve accused pirates were
charged with "acts of piracy on the high seas" in breach of certain sections
of the Piracy and Maritime Violence Act of 2011 of Mauritius. 48 The
twelve men who were accused of piracy were found on "the high seas
around 240 nautical Miles off the Somali Coast. . ." after allegedly
"willfully and unlawfully commit[ting] an act of piracy ... an illegal act

39. Hassan and Others, supra note 4. See also Medvedyev and Others v. France (No. 3394/03,
ECHR, Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?Iibrary-ECHR
&id=001-97979&filename=001-97979.pdf, Vassis and Others v. France (No. 62736/09, June 6, 2013),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdft?ibrary=ECHR&id=001-122306&filename
=001 -122306.pdf&TID=ihgdqbxnfi.
40. Id.See Medvedyev and Others, supra note 39; Vassis and Others, supra note 39.

41. Suspects of Piracy Against French Vessels, supra note 5.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See generally Somali Pirates Win Compensation After Errors in Procedure, HANDY

SHOPPING GUIDE, Dec. 5, 2014, http://handyshippingguide.com/shipping-news/somali-pirates-wincompensation-after-errors-in-procedure_6016 [hereinafter Somali Pirates Win Compensation].

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Police v. Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader (no. 850/2013, § 1,2014).
Id.
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of violence" against a certain ship that was proceeding from Oman to
Kenya.4 9
The Intermediate Court of Mauritius stated that the "rights guaranteed
to the people of Mauritius under the European Convention were rights
which, on independence, have existed and shall continue to exist" within
terms of Section 3.50 Under Mauritius law, the application of rights
granted by the European Convention is a significant interpretive issue
because "while Mauritius is no longer a party of the European Convention
or bound by its terms, the Strasbourg jurisprudence gives persuasive
guidance on the content of the rights, which the people have enjoyed and
should continue to enjoy . .. ,,51 The court invoked Article 5(1) of the
Constitution of Mauritius, which reads as follows:
(1) No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save as may
be authorised by law - . . . (e) upon reasonable suspicion of his
having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence
52

According to the court, the corresponding provision under the ECHR is
Article 5, namely:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and

49. Id.; see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, available at http://www.un.org/depts/Ios/conventionagreements/texts/
unclos/unclos-e.pdf.
50. Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 125. Article 3 of the Mauritius Constitution
reads:
It is hereby recognized and declared that in Mauritius there have existed and shall continue to
exist without discrimination by reason of race, place of origin, political opinions, color, creed
or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest,
each and all of the following human rights and fundamental freedoms--a) the right of the
individual to life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law; (b) freedom of
conscience, of expression, of assembly and association and freedom to establish schools; and
(c) the right of the individual to protection for the privacy of his home and other property and
from deprivation of property without compensation, and the provisions of this chapter shall
have effect for the purpose of affording protection to those rights and freedoms subject to
such limitations of that protection as are contained in those provisions, being limitations
designed to ensure that the enjoyment of those rights and freedoms by any individual does not
prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.
Constitution of Mauritius, Mar. 12, 1968, art. 3.
5 1. Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 125. Strasbourg jurisprudence refers to the
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) jurisprudence. David Campbell, Human Rights and
the Critique of the Common Law Human Rights and the End of Empire, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 791, 795
n.18 (2005). This is due to the fact that the institutions established under the ECHR were based in
Strasbourg. Id.
52. MohamedAli Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 127.
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in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ... (c) the lawful
arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of
having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered
necessary to prevent his committing an offense or fleeing after
53
having done so ....3
The important point derived from Article 5 is that it protects individuals
not only by requiring that the state comply with the substantive and
procedural rules of the laws concerned, "but it also requires that any
deprivation of liberty be compatible with the purpose of Article 5, namely,
to protect the individual from arbitrariness .. .
The Intermediate Court of Mauritius also looked at present laws of
Mauritius under which "the twelve accused were detained and.., found
no provisions regarding contact with a lawyer or family. ' 55 "[I]n short,
these twelve persons were kept completely incommunicado during their
several days on board [the ship], based on domestic French laws
Thus it is unclear whether the detention
mentioned by the commander.
56
was, in fact, non-arbitrary."
The court then turned to review Article V Section 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (as part of the framework of guarantees).57
The article is concerned with two separate matters.58 First the article looks
to "the early stages following an arrest, when an individual is taken into
the power of the authorities," and second to the "period pending any trial
before a criminal court, during which the suspect may be detained or
released with or without conditions. 59
The Intermediate Court of Mauritius also looked at the "promptness" of
the appearance of the arrested individual.6 ° Promptness is important to
"allow detection of any ill-treatment and to keep to a minimum any
unjustified interference with individual liberty ...,,61 The exception to the
3 of the
notion of "promptness" that is required under Article 5
53. Id.§ 128. Article 5 of the ECHR, supra note 16.
54. MohamedAli Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 129.
55. Id.§ 132.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.§ 133.
60. MohamedAli Abdeoulkader,supra note 47, § 133.
61. Id. It will be recalled, that in Hassan v. France the French police did not follow their own
procedures and did not bring the prisoners involved within forty-eight hours according to French law.
See Hassanand Others, supra note 4.
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Convention is limited to "wholly exceptional circumstances" that would
justify a delay in a court's applying its own procedural rules.62 In the case
sub judice, the French had refused to try the twelve persons, so there was
no question of bringing them back to France for trial. 63 There was no proof
of the sea conditions' being rough, which would have given a reason to
prevent the swift navigation by a French vessel to the nearest port or
harbor. 64 The ECHR stated that the twelve accused parties could have been
brought to land within a shorter amount of time if they were taken to
Kenya, Seychelles, or Mauritius. 65 In concluding, the court held that the
prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the twelve
defendants were guilty of the elements of "high seas," "illegal
acts of
66
violence," and withholding of information "for private ends.",
In summary, the Court's reasoning for releasing the twelve pirates due
to human rights violations was because of the State's failure to prosecute
the pirates promptly. Article 5 of the ECHR requires that when an arrested
person is detained, that person must be promptly placed under judicial
control, in order to prevent ill treatment of the person arrested.67 In this
case, the French took too long to allow the accused to appear in court, and
there were no "wholly exceptional circumstances" to justify the delay.68
Before proceeding any further with human rights issues with regard to
the treatment of captured pirates and the applicable laws, it is important to
get a perspective on what has happened with regard to the number of
incidents of piracy and prosecutions, in the past as well as the current state
of affairs. The reader will observe a sharp decline in the number of piracy
incidents off of the coast of Somalia.69

62. MohamedAli Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 133.
63. Id.§ 135.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 140. According to UNCLOS, Piracy consists
of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on
the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such
ship or air-craft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or
of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 49, at 60-61.
67. MohamedAli Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 133.
68. Id. § 136. See Appendix I for a list of violations by Article and State in 2014.
69. STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/250867/number-of-actual-and-attempted-piracyattacks-in-somalia/ (last visited May 21, 2015). The statistic represents the total number of actual and
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA AND ITS
RELATION TO THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Piracy is defined
on the Law of the
Resolution A. 1025
(IMO) twenty-sixth
Piracy as:

in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention
Sea (UNCLOS), and Armed Robbery is defined by
(26) of the International Maritime Organization's
assembly session. 70 Article 101 of UNCLOS defines

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on
the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or air-craft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft,
persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or
aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).71
According to the International Maritime Bureau (1MB), "trends" show that
there were a total of 245 incidents of armed robbery and piracy reported to
the IMB Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) for the year 2014.72 This was a
decline in the number piracy attacks for the fourth consecutive year. 73 The
2014 incidents were broken down as "183 vessels boarded, 28 attempted
attacks, 21 hijackings, and 13 vessels fired upon. Some 442 crewmembers
have been taken hostage, thirteen injured, nine kidnapped from their
vessels, and four killed., 74 Nearly all these figures come from Southeast
Asia and Indonesia: six vessels hijacked in the South China Sea; forty-one
in West Africa, mostly off of Nigeria; and numerous piracy incidents at
other locations. The IMB was concerned enough about human right issues
to think it necessary to include a page on human rights and piracy."
The 1MB pointed out the obvious fact that acts of piracy occur far
enough away from the reach of law enforcement agencies as to make it

attempted piracy attacks in Somalian territorial waters from 2008 to 2014. The statistics your authors
are about to show indicate a decline in piracy.
70. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 49, at 60-6 1.
71. Id.
72. PiracyandArmed Robbery Against Ships, supra note 1,at 29.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.

2016]

THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF SEA PIRATES

impossible for those agencies to respond as the crime unfolds. 76 It is
impossible to get prompt forensic examination because there are no
resources available.77 Law enforcement agencies can take statements, but
it is almost impossible to preserve the rest of the evidence.7 8 In addition, it
is difficult to obtain eyewitnesses who will be available to testify because
they have sailed away on their vessels or were hijacked, only to spend
many long months or years in captivity under appalling conditions.7 9
Finally, according to the IMB, suspected pirates are released only to return
to Somalia to reequip and resume their pirate activities. 80 The IMB
believes that the ECHR decisions on human rights violations will only
lead to further human right violations.8' However, this time the violations
will be committed against innocent people aboard vessels, rather than the
82
pirates.
The problem with these three decisions is not the fact that the court
ruled the way it did so much as the fact as it may discourage European
Navies from taking future actions against pirates along international sea
routes. 83 This article will later observe that the armed guards aboard ships

76. Id. at 31. For examples of cases demonstrating the law enforcements' inability to respond as
the crime of piracy unfolds see Ali Samatar and Others, supra note 3; Hassan and Others, supra note
4. In the Ali Samatar and Others case, the cruise ship was boarded, seized, and made it into the
territorial waters of Somalia before the French navy was able to intercept the pirates. Ali Samatar and
Others, supra note 3. In the Hassan and Others case, the yacht and its occupants were captured on
September 2 and the French navy did not arrive to the scene till September 5. Hassan and Others,
supra note 4.
77. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, supra note I, at 3 1.
78. Id.
79. Id. On March 1, 2015 New York Times wrote that pirates finally freed four fishermen that
were held captive in Somalia for nearly five years longer than any other hostages seized off the Somali
coast. Mohammed Ibrahim, Pirates Free 4 Fishermen In Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2015, at A8.
The United Nations got involved in procuring their release. Id. The Thais that were released were
among twenty-four members of a Taiwanese flagged fishing vessel that was seized April 2010. Id
Fourteen sailors, all from Myanmar, were released a year later and six others died of various illnesses,
according to a statement released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Id.
The pirates had used a vessel as a mother ship, which was captured in 2011. Id. This happened to be
the longest captivity endured by any hostages of Somali pirates. Id. However, Somali pirates are still
holing twenty-six hostages who were abducted from another fishing vessel in March 2012. Id.
80. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, supra note 1, at 31.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. In May of 2010, ten suspected Somali pirates were captured and then released in an
inflatable boat without navigational equipment. Russian Navy 'Sent Somali Pirates to their Death',
THE WEEK, May 12, 2010, available at http://www.theweek.co.uk/politics/14701/russian-navy-'sentsomali-pirates-their-death'. These ten suspected pirates are thought to have died because contact with
the boat's radio beacon was lost within the hour after setting them adrift. Id. Colonel Alexei
Kuznetzov released the pirates due to the "imperfections in international law" and using the reasoning
of "Why should we feed some pirates?" ld.
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might execute the pirates preemptively, rather than arresting and holding
them for trial.
The following diagram depicts the actual attempted piracy attacks
originating from Somalia between the years 2008 and 2014.
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF ACTUAL AND ATTEMPTED PIRACY ATTACKS IN

SOMALIA FROM 2008 TO 201484
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It can be seen from the diagram that the number of actual and
attempted pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia increased and are now
finally on a downward trend. In this regard, there was a think-tank at the
Harvard Kennedy Center, to which this author was invited, in December86
2009.85 There were twenty-five persons in attendance at the think-tank.
The idea was to have presentations on what to do about the steep rise in
piracy off of the Somali coastline. 87 Those present included experts on
piracy, a few academics, retired and active admirals and naval captains, a
representative from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a representative from

84. STATISTA, supra note 69. The statistic represents the total number of actual and attempted
piracy attacks in Somalian territorial waters from 2008 to 2014.
85. Combating Maritime Piracy, supra note 2, at 3. The findings and conclusion of that
discussion were edited and assembled by our host, Professor Robert I. Robert. The findings and
conclusions appear at STAT1STA, supra note 69.

86. Id.
87. Id.
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Swedish intelligence, Mrs. Hillary Clinton's assistant at the U.S. State
Department, former ambassadors to Somalia, a security company
(C.E.O.), and persons on the ground in Somalia.88
At that time in December 2009, as can be seen from Table 1, the
number of pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia had jumped from
nineteen in 2008 to eighty in 2009.89 The idea behind the think tank was to
create and recommend ideas regarding matters such as providing security
for ships and their crews, assisting the government of Somalia, and
strengthening the legal response. 90 One question that was asked was "what
to do with captured pirates and confiscated ships" because there were a
"variety of national legal approaches" to the piracy problem at that time,
and there were "diverse views amongst nations on international law
regarding" whether universal jurisdiction gave each State the necessary
precedent to try pirates. 91 It was pointed out at this meeting that some of
the Sates at the time were weary of imprisoning and trying pirates for
various reasons. 92 For example, it would look ill for countries that were
predominantly European to try persons of color for piracy.
There was also the problem of where to transport the captured pirates.
At the time, Kenya was trying certain pirates, and there was a prison in
Mombasa that held 119 pirates, ten of whom had been convicted.93 Other
nations were just catching and releasing pirates because they did not have
any domestic municipal laws on the subject of piracy and did not wish to
get involved with pirates' serving time in prison and then asking for
94
asylum after their sentences.
It was pointed out at the think-tank sessions that there was no domestic
or international legal impediment "to trying pirates locally or regionally, in
existing or specially created tribunals." 95 Almost everyone present at the
meeting agreed "that there were ample legal resources for the trial [of
pirates]" and "there was no excuse . . . not to prosecute [them]. 96 So the
group of experts recommended: First, the possible creation of an "extraterritorial court," which would use Somali law and possibly be based in
"Somaliland, in Djibouti, or elsewhere in the region, to handle all pirate

88. Id.
89. STATISTA, supra note 69.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Combating Maritime Piracy, supra note 2, at 4.
Id.at 10.
Id.
Id.
id.
Id.
at11.
Combating Maritime Piracy, supra note 2,at11.
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cases." 97 The African Union (AU) or the UN would have to authorize the
court and the procedures. 98 There would also have to be a 99prison system
established, which would be rather expensive but necessary.
The second point made at the conference was to use "Kenya as a court
of first jurisdiction for piracy cases," although there was a "backlog of
cases, procedural shortcomings, legal questions, and the short-handedness
of the Kenyan prosecutorial and judicial staffs."' 00 The other possibility
was using Tanzania, the Seychelles, Mauritius, and other countries that
would volunteer to have pirates tried in their own court system.' 0 ' It was
suggested that UN Resolution 1897 be expanded to make the "existence of
equipment capable of being [used] for purpose of piracy prima facie
evidence of piratical intent."' 1 2 This of course was due to the fact that we
were concerned about pirates' receiving a fair trial. We were also
concerned with finding a proper way to preserve evidence. Evidence such
as mother ships and other pirate vessels, grappling hooks and ladders,
other types of specialized equipment, rocket-propelled grenade launchers,
and machine guns could all be confiscated at sea.' 0 3 But they could also be
dropped overboard before capture, making the possible evidence disappear
into the sea. In order to expand upon UN Resolution 1897, an agreement
would be necessary among the "UN Security Council and countries
around the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian
Ocean."' 4 This agreement would "harmonize[] their rules regarding
bringing weapons aboard merchant vessels into port."' 0 5
Finally, there was a suggestion that the 1988 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation'0 6 (SUA) be expanded, as well as the Djibouti Code of
Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. 107 It was
thought that if these updates took place, then there would be a

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Combating Maritime Piracy,supra note 2, at 11. See Appendix III for UN Resolution 1897.
Id.

104.

Id.

105. Id. Today, most of these weapons are left on floating platforms; supposedly there are thirtythree of them operational in the world today.
106. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
1678 U.N.T.S. 201, 27 I.L.M. 668, Mar. 10, 1988, available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/
conventions/Conv8.pdf.
107. Combating Maritime Piracy,supra note 2, at 11.
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strengthening of "international legal codes concerning and permitting the
prosecution of pirates and pirate financiers."' 0 8
At the time of the Harvard meeting in December 2009 and for a while
after, it was obvious that there were practical limitations on prosecution,
including a lack of trained lawyers and judges as well as adequate prisons.
Where could pirates be prosecuted? Where could pirates be prosecuted
given the limited amount of time and resources available to carry out
actual capture and trial?
The lack of judicial trial capacity and lack of prison capacity created
legal issues that would contribute to human rights violations. This is due to
the fact that the treatment of captured pirates was considered a very minor
issue on the international scale compared to the number of problems they
had been causing and the number of people they had been injuring by their
acts. 10 9 There were conventional considerations concerning human rights
other than UNCLOS.
The European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) applies
to people within the effective control of any state that is a member of the
ECHR, which consists of all the member states of the Council of Europe
(currently forty-seven)." 0 Other relevant treaties include the UN
Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.' Issues that come up, as seen by the cases already
mentioned, include "the length of time [prisoners] can be detained,
humane treatment, right to a fair trial, and prison conditions. ' 12 The

108. Id.
109. Arabella Thorp, Preventing and Prosecuting Piracy at Sea: Legal Issues, HOUSE OF
COMMON LIBRARIES, Feb. 28, 2012, available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06237
[hereinafter Preventingand ProsecutingPiratesat Sea].
110. Id. Questions & Answers, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Questions Answers ENG.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2015). See also European Convention
on Human Rights, art. 1, June 2010, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_
ENG.pdf.
I11. Preventing and Prosecuting Pirates at Sea, supra note 109, at 16. United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec.

10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988). The desire of the United Nations General Assembly had
when it adopted this treaty was "to make more effective the struggle against torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world." Id. International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Article 7 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights "torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." Id. art. 7.
112.

Preventing and Prosecuting Piratesat Sea, supra note 109, at 17. See Appendix 1. The chart

sets forth violations by Article and by State for the year 2014.
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potential human rights issues for holding pirates at sea can be complex and
nuanced:
For those states which are parties to the European Convention on
Human Rights, there is no legal problem with their public vessels
holding pirates on board for the purpose of taking them to a proper
jurisdiction for arrest and prosecution. There may, however, be a
problem in relation to the holding of pirates on their own vessels,
and not allowing them to go, for the purpose of disruption of piracy,
rather than of detention for prosecution. 113
The ECHR held in the cases of Rigopoulos and Medveyev that under
Article 5(3) of the ECHR, "long periods of detention are not compatible
.,,14 The ECHR called for a "legal framework for detention at sea."" 5
Countries such as Germany, Kenya, Russia, and Spain "have
constitutional limits of one or two days from capture to appearance before
a judge."' 16 In addition, pirates that are captured should be treated under
international human rights standards." 7 Capturing countries should make
certain that trials and prisons in the countries in which they transfer
suspected pirates meet these standards; otherwise, the capturing country
could breach its own human rights obligations." 18 An example of these
difficulties was highlighted in a Danish case:
The Danish Navy ship Absalon on 17 September 2008 captured 10
pirates in the waters off Somalia. After six days' detention and the
confi[]scation of their weapons, ladders, and other implements used
to board ships, the Danish government decided to free the pirates by
putting them ashore on a Somali beach. The Danish authorities had
come to the conclusion that the pirates risked torture and the death
penalty if [they] surrendered to (whatever) Somali authorities. This
was unacceptable, as Danish law prohibits the extradition of
criminals when they may face the death penalty. Moreover, they
were not ready to try them in Denmark as it would be difficult (in
light of the possible abuses they would risk) to deport them back to
Somalia after their sentences were served. It is clear that human
rights considerations, or perhaps reasons of expediency presented as

113. Preventing and ProsecutingPiratesat Sea, supra note 109, at 17.

114. Id.
115.

Id.

116. Id.
117. Id.
118.

Id.
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human rights concerns, prevailed over considerations concerning
the fight against piracy. 9
In the end, a Danish judge threw out the case against pirates for lack of
promptness. More important, the question has been raised at different
times as to whether the "right" persons are being prosecuted for piracy.
The pirates who have been prosecuted, for the most part, were "the 'foot
soldiers' rather than their superiors.' 20 In Somalia, there were very few
persons actually on top of the food chain with regard to sea pirates.12 '
"Naval forces estimate that there are about 50 main pirate leaders, around
300 leaders of pirate attack groups, and around 2,500 'foot soldiers.' It is
believed that financing is provided by around 10 to 20 individuals.' ' 22 The
Security Council Committee Monitoring Group on the Somalia weapons
embargo "has identified not only the key leaders of pirate militias and
networks, but also their location 24and political connections."'' 23 Many of
them were reportedly in Somalia. 1
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) created a
"piracy prosecution model."'' 2 5 According to the UNODC, the regional
prosecution model has been "an innovative criminal justice response to
piracy. ' ' 26 The UNODC program provided several suggestions to regional
prosecuting States:
Legislative implementation and reform; facilitating the signing of
transfer agreements between prosecuting States and naval forces, as
well as re-transfer agreements for sentenced prisoners; building,
renovating, and upgrading police, prison, and court facilities;
enhancing law enforcement and correctional services at the strategic
level; monitoring and enhancing detention facilities; the provision
of welfare support and interpretation services to piracy suspects
detained on remand; the placement of in-house police, prosecution
and prison mentors into national agencies; provision of vehicles and
specialist equipment to law enforcement bodies; and wide-ranging

119. Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of
Somalia, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 399, 408-09 (2009).
120.

Preventing and Prosecuting Pirates at Sea, supra note 109, at 18.

121. Id.
122. Report of the Secretary-General on the Modalities for the Establishment of Specialized
Somali Anti-Piracy Courts, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, June 21, 2011, at Annex I.
123. Preventing and Prosecuting Pirates at Sea, supra note 109, at 18.
124. Id.
125. Maritime Crime Programme-Indian Ocean, UNODC, http://www.unodc.orgfunodc/en/
piracy/indian-ocean-division.html (last visited May 21, 2015).
126. Id.
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for lawyers, Judges, Police, Coast Guards and
training initiatives
127
officials.
Prison
In addition, the Maritime Crime Programmee (MPC) provides
"[t]ranscription services for trials; [f]unding for defense lawyers
representing suspected pirates; [c]ourtroom translation [and] interpretation
services; []costs associate[ed] with flying foreign civilian witnesses (e.g.
seafarers) to the prosecuting [state] to testify in person; [and] [e]quipment
for video-teleconferencing of foreign witnesses unable to testify in
person.128
The UNODC set forth a list of piracy prosecution statistics.
2014129
TABLE 2: PIRACY PROSECUTION STATISTICS AT OCTOBER
SOMALI PIRACY PRISONERS-KENYA
Total

Status

Detained By

Number of Prisoners (Sentence)

On Remand

Denmark

4

4 On remand

Convicted

Denmark

24

160 Tried

EUNAVFOR (Spain)

4 (7 years)

143 Convicted

EUNAVFOR (Germany)

9 (5 years)

101 Remaining in Kenya

United States

7 (4 years)

42 Post-sentence repatriations

United States

9 (5 years)

10 in 2011

EUNAVFOR (Sweden)

7 (7 years)

7to Puntland in November 2013

EUNAVFOR (Germany)

7 (20 years)

7 to Puntland in January 2014

EUNAVFOR (France)

I1 (5 years)*

7 + 11 to Puntland in February
2014

Acquitted

United States

10 (8 years) Sentence complete

United Kingdom

8 (10 years)

EUNAVFOR (Germany)

7 (5 years) Sentence complete

EUNAVFOR (Spain)

7 (5 years)

EUNAVFOR (France)

11 (20 years)

United Kingdom

6 (5 years)

EUNAVFOR (Spain)

7 (4.5 years) Sentence complete

EUNAVFOR (Italy)

9 (7 years)

United States

17

17 Acquitted
17 Repatriated in December
2010

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.

2016]

THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF SEA PIRATES

SOMALI PIRACY PRISONERS-SEYCHELLES
Status

Detained By

Number of Prisoners (Sentence)

On Remand

EUNAVFOR (France)

5

Denmark

9

Denmark

4(3 x 24 years, I x 16 years)

133 Tried

Denmark

4 (3 x 21 years, I x 14 years)

129 Convicted

Netherlands

6 (5 x 24 years, I x 12 years)

22 Remaining in Seychelles

Netherlands

11 (6 x 16 yrs, 3 x 5 yrs, I x 4 yrs, I
x 1.5
yrs)
I (6 years)

96 Prisoner transfers

EUNAVFOR (Spain)

I I (10 years)

17 to Somaliland Mar 12

EUNAVFOR
(Netherlands)
Seychelles Coastguard

9 (7 x 6 years), 2 x 4uvenile acquitted

12to Somaliland Dec 12

I1 (10 years)

5 to Puntland Dec 12

10 (20 years)

25 to Puntland Mar 13

6 (24 years)

8 to Puntland May 13

5 (18 years)

I1 to Puntland Oct 13

9 (8 x 22 years, I x tuvenile
acquitted)
7 (6 x 7 years, I x 2 years)

18 to Puntland March 14

Convicted

EUNAVFOR (France)

United Kingdom
United Kingdom

United States
Acquitted

Total
14 On remand

I1
Post-sentence
repatriations
I to Puntland Aug 12

14 (3 x 2.5 years, 8 x 12 years, I x
pleaded
guilty 10 years, I x juvenile time
served,
I x quvenile acquitted)

5 to Puntland Oct 13

15 (13 x 18 years, 2 x 4 years)

2 to Puntland Oct 14

3 to Puntland May 14

United Kingdom

4 Acquitted

Seychelles Coastguard

4 Repatriations after acquittal

EUNAVFOR
(Netherlands)

I to Puntland Aug 12
1 to Puntland May 14
2 to Puntland Sept 14

SOMALI PIRACY PRISONERS-MAURITIUS
Status

Detained By

Number of Prisoners (Sentence)

On Remand

EUNAVFOR (France)

12

Total
12On remand
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These statistics will give the reader an idea of the number of
prosecutions that have been undertaken in an attempt to deter acts of
piracy. The goal is also to make certain that once the pirates serve their
sentences, they are rehabilitated and sent back to Somalia. However, these
prosecutions do not come free. The most important problem regarding
human rights, as far as your authors are concerned, involves minimizing
the burden of prosecuting pirates (i.e. so that ship owners and navy
personnel do not become frustrated by illegal impediments and take the
law into their own hands by covertly shooting and dumping the pirates at
sea).
III. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC COURSE OF
MARITIME (SOMALIA) PIRACY AND MINIMIZING THE BURDEN OF
PROSECUTING PIRATES

The following chart gives a breakdown of the overall cost of maritime
piracy.
TABLE 3: THE ECONOMIC COST OF MARITIME (SOMALIA) PIRACY'

30

Cost Factor

2010

2011

2012

Ransom
Insurance
Re-routing Shos

$178million
$460million -$32 bilion
$2.4-$3 biion

$160milion
$135milion
$486 milion -$681 mullon

$31.75 million
$550.7 mllion
$290. milion

Security
Equipment and Guard
and MitaryOperation
NavalForces
Prosecutons
andImpmsonrnent
Oiganizations
CounterPRacy

bilDn
$363 minion- $2.5
$2 bilion
$31milion

$1.064 -$1.16 Mlon
$127 bigion
$16.4
milion

$19.5million

$21.30

$1.65- 2.06
$1.09blion
$14.9 mtIon
S24.0 milion

Cost
to Regional
Econnies
Labour
Speed
Increased

$1.25 bi1ion
WA
NA
$7-$12 bllion

NIA
$195mrin
$2.71bion

NIA
$471.6 million
$1.53
blilon

$.6- $6.9billion

$5.74$.1 billion

Cost
Total Estimated

As can be seen above, as of 2013, the World Bank estimated the
economic cost of piracy off the coast of Somalia at $18 billion, with a
margin of error of roughly US $6 billion. This is acting as a "hidden tax on

130. Maritime Piracy, Part 1:An Overview of Trends, Cost, and Trade-Related Implications,
14 (2014). Gather the information from One Earth Future (OEF) (2013).

UNITED NATIONS,
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world trade, [and] reflects [] increased trade cost; it does not account for
31
losses to tourism and fisheries, which are addressed separately."'1
Turning to the cost of ransoms and their economic32 impact, Table 4 sets
forth the evolution of ransoms collected by pirates. 1
TABLE 4: EVOLUTION OF RANSOMS: ANNUAL AMOUNTS COLLECTED
BY SOMALI-BASED PIRATES IN RANSOMS FOR VESSELS AND/OR CREWS
KIDNAPPED BETWEEN 2005 AND 2012113
U Low

200S

2006

estknate

2007

U

2003

High estimate

2009

2010

2011

2012

The ransom value is actually much higher, however, "as in addition to
the ransomed amounts, there remain other associated costs, which are not
accounted for, including the cost of ransom value negotiations and the

131. Id.at 14. Oceans Beyond Piracy published their 2014 report with the updated statistics
regarding the cost of prosecutions and imprisonment of pirates. This chart represents the updated
information:

I I

~

INorth Arica

$307,355
4

1

I

$7,314

120

$307,3
$949AN0

26
841

1$28,284
-1.-

OCEANS BEYOND PIRACY, THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY REPORT

Foundation 2014).
132. Id.
133

Id at 16

$735.384
I$33.0

51.042.739
$6,25k00

2014 21 (One Earth Future
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means used to deliver the ransom money."'' 34 As this value has increased,
"so [has] the duration of negotiations and of captivity. Up from 55 days in
being held hostage for an average duration of
2009, seafarers are now
' 35
three to four months."'
Even with the increased cost, pirates are considered and treated as
criminals rather than combatants. 36 Since pirates are not enemy
combatants, the U.S. Navy and others are restricted on what they can and
cannot do with regard to attacking and capturing pirates. 137 For example,
despite the fact that naval forces patrolling the Somali coast have an
expanded legal mandate, they are not allowed to launch attacks on
suspected pirates' vessels until the pirates attempt to board another
vessel.13 8 Thus, the navy's actions are largely defensive. 39 "Navies are
also not allowed to pursue pirates to shore for fear of incurring civilian
naval forces have
casualties"; 4 ° however, in the case of Somalia, foreign
4'
been given the authority to enter territorial waters.'
It is difficult for navies to proceed because they are not accustomed to
attacking pirates, but rather other warships. 42 In other words, human
rights concerns and safeguards impede their normal operations. Naval
personnel are not trained to follow rules for pirates regarding apprehension
procedures and evidence collection. 43 They are uncertain of what
"constitutes evidence of a piratical act or an attempt of the act . . . ." 44 The
boarding of a fishing vessel by skiffs (vessels pirates use) or the
possession of an AK-47 may present problems for navies as far as
gathering evidence is concerned. 45 Under Article 110 of the UNCLOS,
warships are permitted to board merchant ships suspected of being

134. ld
135. Id.
136. Debrah Osiro, Somali Pirates Have Rights Too: Judicial Consequences and Human Rights
Concerns, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES, at 7 (2011), available at https://www.issafrica.org/
uploads/Paper224SomaliPirates.pdf [hereinafter Somali Pirates Have Rights Too].
137. Id.
138. id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1816 (June 2, 2008). This resolution allows States
cooperating with TFG in the fight against piracy and armed robbery off of the cost of Somalia to enter
into the territorial waters of Somalia or the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at
sea. Id.
142. See Somali Pirates Have Rights Too, supra note 136, at 7.
143. ld
144. id.
145. Id.
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piratical in nature or transporting slaves. 146 However, fishing skiffs, used
by the Somalis, are not exactly what the navy personnel are accustomed to
dealing with.' 47 This has, in a few instances, lead to an attempt to go back
to the "good old days."'' 48 It becomes costly to have the burden of proving
a piratical act, especially when human rights concerns are taken into
account during trials. The trials, by definition, are not summary
proceedings.
"Equipment articles widen the scope of criminal liability by creating
primafacie evidence that a vessel is a pirate ship.,' 49 This would mean
that a crew could be found guilty of piracy if they are aware of the
presence of certain specified equipment on board their ship (e.g. weapons,
ladders, and grappling hooks, etc.). 150 However, the weapons would be

146. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. I10, Dec. 10, 1982 [hereinafter
UNCLOS]. This article of the UNCLOS states that
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship which
encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled to complete immunity in
accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable
ground for suspecting that:
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy;
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade;
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has
jurisdiction under article 109;
(d) the ship is without nationality; or
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the
same nationality as the warship.
2. In the cases provided for in paragraph 1, the warship may proceed to verify the ship's right
to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the command of an officer to the
suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it may proceed
to a further examination on board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible
consideration.
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not
committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may
have been sustained.
4. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft.
5. These provisions also apply to any other duly authorized ships or aircraft clearly marked
and identifiable as being on government service.
Id.
147. Somali Pirates Have Rights Too, supra note 136, at 7.
148. Id.
149. Id. Equipment articles are regulations that construct a "judicial presumption of guilt on piracy
charges for the crews of civilian vessels possessing certain specified equipment within a certain
defined area of the high seas plagued by pirate attacks." Eugene Kontorovich, Equipment Articlesfor
the Prosecution of Maritime Piracy, Discussion Paper for One Earth Future Foundation, May 2010,
http://www.oneearthfuture.org/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2015). The same approach is being used against
drug traffickers. Somali Pirates Have Rights Too, supra note 136, at 7.
150. Id.
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thrown overboard at the first indication that a patrol ship is approaching
them for boarding."51
15 2
Over the years abuses have taken place, which is a known concern.
For example, the sinking of an alleged pirate vessel by the Indian Navy
vessel Tabar, resulted in the death of fourteen people. 153 At the time the
Tabar officials claimed self-defense; that they were dealing with "a 'pirate
mothership' in 'description and intent"'; but that the "the . . . 'pirates'
were actually crew members [who]154had been taken hostage when their
Thai fishing boat ... was hijacked.,
Another country that has run into human rights issues regarding pirates
is Russia. As a party to European Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by the European Court of Human
Rights, Russia "has an obligation to safeguard the lives of pirates in its
custody and accord them due . . . process before sanctioning."'' 55 There
have been fishermen in Yemen who have "complain[ed] of increasing[ly]
aggressive harassment by the [Russian] naval armada, including illegal
searches and seizures."'51 6 Those Yemeni fishermen consider the Russian
"naval forces to be as dangerous as the pirates themselves."' 7 The
Russians were accused of throwing certain pirates overboard by forcing
them to leave the Russian ship where they were being held and placed on a
raft on the open seas, which, of course, was a death sentence.' 58
The numbers of suspected pirate casualties are difficult to ascertain,
primarily because if a number exists, that statistic has not been released to
the public. 59 "Considering the cost and difficulty of prosecuting Somali
pirates, a country can put pressure on the prosecution to encourage the
suspects to plead guilty so as to avoid a trial which they would likely lose
if due process were followed or, once on trial, for the court to deliver a
guilty verdict so as to avoid or postpone determining repatriation
issues.' 60 "The governments are therefore only offering human rights
as opposed to protecting the inherent rights of
guarantees selectively,
' 6'
pirates."'
Somali

151.
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153.
154.
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Id.
Id.
Id.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Pirates are under the protection guaranteed by the Convention as soon
as they are under the effective control of a state naval vessel. 62 So the
states must secure for pirates within their jurisdictions the rights and
freedoms defined in that convention.' 63 For the captured pirates, the
Convention provides:
[W]hether the act occurred in Somali waters or on the high seas, can
thus assert human rights protection/violations under Articles 2 (right
to life); 3 (prohibition of torture and other forms of inhumane and
degrading treatment); 5 (right to liberty and security-relating to
detention); 6 (right to a fair trial); and 7 (due judicial process before
punishment).'64
Once an alleged pirate is captured, he is "within the 'effective control' of
an ECHR contracting party if he is detained by a European navy.' 6 5 The
ECHR, in Hassan and Others and Medvedyev and Others v. France cases,
"clarified that the 'holding' of pirates by the navies is in contravention of
' 66
Article 5 as it deprives them of their liberty."'
However, it is uncertain if ECHR jurisdiction applies if the pirates
are on board a skiff that is under a naval vessel's control, with some
[S]tates like Russia assuming that ECHR jurisdiction therefore does
not apply. They question how such can apply if 'control' was never
67
intended for the purpose of arrest but for eventual freedom. 1
"The length of time it takes to bring the suspects to trial is an impediment"
because of the distance travelled from Somalia to France, for example.
The court came to the conclusion that the naval forces' failure to allow the
prisoners the opportunity to contact their "lawyers and relatives was a
breach of human rights."' 68 The navy was also unsuccessful in informing
169
"judicial authorities of their actions, thereby violating the French laws."'
Article 3 of the ECHR demands an absolute duty to "refrain from
subjecting a person to inhumane treatment and [to] protect a person from

162.

Somali PiratesHave Rights Too, supra note 136, at 7-8.

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Somali Pirates Have Rights Too, supranote 136, at 8.
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inhumane treatment." 170 Western states have obligations under the doctrine
of non-refoulement. 171 The non-refoulement principle "prohibits the
expulsion, extradition, deportation, return or otherwise removal of any
where the
person in any manner whatsoever to a country or territory
172
person would face a real risk of persecution or serious harm."'
In an article, Professor Dubner recently discussed the hiring of Private
Security Companies (PSC) and the use of armed guards for their
vessels. 17 3 Private armed security guards (PASGs) cannot "board vessels
and detain[] suspect pirates . . ." but they have been used as an effective
1 74
deterrent--"no ship with PASGs on board has been hijacked.
However, there are various human rights issues that arise when using
PASGs at sea:
When can they use force, and to what extent? Who gives the order
to use force? How can they transport their weapons legally? There
are also practical questions such as whether using PASGs would
escalate levels of violence, whether they would make non-guarded
vulnerable, and whether PSCs should be regulated and
ships more175
accredited.
Professor Dubner's article went on to state that as of 2012 these PASGs
of piracy off the
have been extremely effective to the point that the amount
176
coast of Somalia has dropped to practically nothing.
As far as the issue of bringing firearms and other weapons into ports,
PASGs use floating armories off various countries so that they can go on
board these armories, pick up whatever arms they need, and proceed to the
ship they are protecting. 177 When PASGs get off the ship, they are178again
leaving the arms on the flotilla and starting the process over again. This

170. Id. Article 3 of the ECHR states that: "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." European Convention on Human Rights, art. 3, June 2010,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ConventionENG.pdf.
171. Somali PiratesHave Rights Too, supra note 136, at 8.
172. Id.
173. Barry Hart Dubner & Claudia Pastorius, On the Effectiveness of Private Security Guards on
Board Merchant Ships Off the Coast of Somalia-Where Is the Piracy? What Are the Legal

Ramifications?, 39 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1029, 1053 (2014) [hereinafter On the Effectiveness
of Private Security Guards].
174. Thorp, supra note 110.
175. Id.
176. On the Effectiveness of Private Security Guards, supra note 173, at 1053.
177. Sarah Kent & Cassie Werber, How Floating Armories Help Guard Cargo Ships From
Pirates on High Seas, WALL ST. J.,Feb. 3, 2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/howfloating-armories-help-guard-cargo-ships-from-pirates-on-high-seas-1 422934573.
178.

Id.
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is not to say that it is the only reason that the level of piracy has dropped,
but it certainly is coincidental.
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which is a coordinating
body with twenty government members, started compiling incident reports
and found that there was a 22 percent jump in armed robbery and pirate
ships in Asia. This accounted for three-quarters of global maritime piracy
in the year 2014.179 The idea of putting armed guards aboard ships passing
through the Malacca Strait and nearby waters is a bad one because it
would increase the dangers to sailors and increase the level of violence
used by the perpetrators.' 80 When it was decided to use regional patrols
instead of armed guards aboard the ships ReCAAP had the statistics for
the drop in piracy off of Somalia, but apparently those statistics did not
ring true to them. Historically the owners of vessels had serious concerns
about crewmen killing each other if arms were placed on board.
The seafarers' support group, the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian
Response Programme (MPHRP), has criticized the ECHR's decision in
Hassan and Others.'8' Roy Paul, the program director for the MPHRP,
said:
This decision would be unbelievable if it wasn't made by the
European Court of Human Rights. The claim that this constituted a
'violation of their rights to freedom and security' is an insult to the
seafarers and yachtsmen they attacked as surely this is the true
violation of the seafarers' rights to freedom and security. These
pirates, in my opinion, gave up any of their rights when they set sail
to attack
innocent seafarers who were simply doing their essential
82
work. 1

It is important to remember that there is a difference between pirates, who
are considered non-enemy combatants, and terrorists, who are considered
enemy combatants. Each is treated differently along the procedural avenue
before trial. A U.S. naval friend of Professor Dubner (hereinafter "X") said
that his "overall concern is clearly that this ruling is a great recruiting tool.
Not only do you get paid to be a pirate, but now, go ahead and get

179. Keith Wallis, Asia Maritime Piracy Attacks Rise to 75 Percent of Global Total, REUTERS,
Jan. 14, 2015, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/14/us-asia-piracy-idUSKBNOKN
10020150114.

180. Id.
181.

Compensating Pirates Worries IMB, THE MARITIME HUB, Dec. 30, 2014, available at

https://icc-ccs.org/news/1039-imb-concemed-over-decision-to-compensate-pirates.
182. Id.
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captured, as you'll earn 10 years worth of annual salary just for being held
The opinion of the seafarers' union
for two days in prison. '
representative, as well as the author's naval friend, is the main concern of
those who believe that the pirates should have little or no rights as
criminals.
IV. A MODEST SUGGESTION FOR OBTAINING A SPEEDIER TRIAL WITHOUT
SO MUCH WEAR AND TEAR ON NAVAL PERSONNEL AND PIRATES

In 2010, Professor Dubner had a suggestion regarding the most
efficient way to try pirates; namely, a UN sanction ship that would go out
on circuit to try pirates.1 84 Currently, with the millions of dollars being
poured into Somalia and elsewhere in order to create a judicial system and
proper human jails by the UNODC, there is no reason why this idea could
not be used to supplement the regional piracy trials in Kenya, Seychelles,
Mauritius, and elsewhere in the region. In fact, X has told your author that
he had seen "a couple of coalition ships heading to join the counter-piracy
mission. The ships are modular and were specifically configured for
counter-piracy, to include a special brig just for pirates. ' 85 As he said:
The setup was very cool to see, a space dedicated to both the guards
and the pirates. It allowed the cells to be unlocked remotely to give
access to shower/heads, as well as eating areas, while the guards
could observe from the other side of a partition. It also had built in
tear gas and gun ports for any resistance. 86
He believed that "these ships were designed to sail1' 87back with their
prisoners, or at least to hold them for extended periods."
The suggestion was also made that there be an agreed upon level of
sentencing to choose between.18 8 X suggests that designating or assigning
a ship to be the mobile magistrate for maritime piracy rulings would

183. E-mail from Anonymous to Barry Heart Dubner (Jan. 9, 2015, 12:22 EST) (on file with
author).
184. See Barry H. Dubner & Joseph P. Henn, On Selecting a Judicial System(s) to Try Sea
Pirates-An Interesting/Necessary Exercise But is it Enough to Deter the Attacks/Hijackings?, 42 J.
MAR. L. &COM. 569, 589 (2011).
185. E-mail from Anonymous to Barry Heart Dubner (Jan. 12, 2015, 22:25 EST) (on file with
author).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. E-mail from Anonymous to Barry Heart Dubner (Jan. 14, 2015, 10:06 EST) (on file with
author).
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probably be well received and efficient.' 8 9 The ship could be a modified
version of one of the ones that he linked to us or a smaller ship made to
have a brig, courtroom, and then residences for the staff.' 90 There would
need to be security escorts for a yacht, while a modified warship would be
less vulnerable or identifiable. 19' There would be an EU or NATO
magistrate that would eliminate the lack of standardization (uniformity)
and jurisdiction (international waters) concerns. 92 In this regard each State
could drop off their prisoners at the ship. They would be tried in the court
on the ship. If the pirates are found guilty, the court would then arrange to
have them sent for jailing, fines, or released.' 93 A considered sentence
might be handed down because the pirate leaders are drawing from people
who make $100 US per year and, therefore, it would be difficult to
dissuade them from committing piracy.' 94 On the other hand, punishing
the bottom of the food chain is not curing the problem. They may prefer to
get three meals a day in prison and then seek asylum. This, however, is a
separate issue.
There is an excellent study by Professor Eugene Kontorovich entitled:
The Penaltiesfor Piracy. He stated that the paper he prepared was "the
first global empirical study of the penalties for piracy."'195 He found, in
part, that the "longest and shortest sentences for similar acts of piracy by
Somalis spans the entire spectrum of possible jail times, from 4.5 or 5
years in Kenya, the Netherlands, and Yemen, to life in the U.S. and
U.A.E."' 196 He also found that the mean sentence worldwide was sixteen
years, "slightly less on a per-defendant basis."' 97 He recommended, in
part:
In a world of sentencing disparities, the choice of forums made by a
capturing nation entails a decision about penalties. Thus suspected
pirates could be transferred "up" the severity gradient. This suggests
that one previously unappreciated advantage of a dedicated
international piracy tribunal or chamber would be the elimination of

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
author).
195.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
E-mail from Anonymous to Barry Heart Dubner (Jan. 14, 2015, 10:06 EST) (on file with
Eugene Kontorovich, The Penalties for Piracy: An Empirical Study of National Prosecution

for International Crime, Nw. PUB. L. RESEARCH PAPER No. 12-16, at 1 (July 10, 2012).

196. Id.at 9.
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sentencing disparities. The creation of such a court was
recommended by the Report of the Special Adviser to the SecurityGeneral on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
(S/2011/30).'98

He stated, the same thing your author did years ago, that the data presented
in his study "may lend support to the creation of 'specialized anti-piracy
courts,' as recommended in the Report of the Secretary-General on
specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other states in the region
(S/2012/50), which advocates enlisting regional states as prosecution
centers."1 99
As the reader has observed there are many statistics available as far as
the number of pirates, their sentences, and other related information.
However, the UNODC received reports that prison officials in Somalia
have been receiving bribery payments, and because of those payments

198. Id. at 15.
199. Id. Professor Kontorovich also has two appendices, which include sentences by region and
severity of crime. These are set forth as follows:
Sentences by Region:
Max. Sentence

Mean

Global

60

18.85

Europe

30

9.75"

Min. Sentence

United States

29.00

Regional

23.88

Severity of Crime:

Level of violence
Attempt
Shots fired
Detention
Assault/injury
Death
Hours Aboard
0
1-100
101-200
Over 200
Id.at 17-18.

Min. Sentence
5
4.5
5.5
5
13

Max. Sentence
20
60
34
24
60

Mean

Min. Sentence

Max. Sentence
20
60
60
30

Mean

5
12
7
5

7.13
8.59
21.88

29.50
34.33

5.38
21.25
26.60
34.33
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sixty convicted pirates were released from prison in Somaliland. 200 The
UNODC, since that time, poured a lot of money into Somalia in order to
create and establish Somalia tribunals,
which would serve as a specialized
20 1
system of extra-judicial courts.
There has always been concern about the "treatment of suspected
pirates once they are captured., 20 2 As indicated earlier in the Hassan and
other case, the ECHR concerns the right to a fair trial; the prohibition of
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment; the non-application of the
death penalty; and respect of the right of the detainees.20 3 The prosecution
of children also produces concerns.2°4 One of the main concerns just a few
years ago was that the current international framework at the time did not
provide a clear definition of acts of piracy and did not require states to
criminalize acts of piracy. 20 5 That problem has been readily solved by the
creation of extra-territorial courts placed throughout Seychelles, Kenya,
and Mauritius. Each of those states, as well as the European states, have
created piracy statutes, which did not exist on their books, so that the
pirates could be brought to any of those countries, in the geographic region
around Somalia, and receive a trial.
Many serious human rights issues arise when prosecuting pirates
outside of their home countries. 20 6 First, because pirates do not carry legal
documents the arresting authorities cannot determine by evidentiary proof
whether they are minors or not.20 7 The second problem regards the
obtaining of the translations or simultaneous translations of legal
proceedings from the language in which they are held into the Somali
language.20 8 Third, when naval officers are witnesses, they often have to
travel long distances from their ships or their home country to a foreign
country to testify and are usually restricted from giving militarily sensitive
evidence.20 9 Fourth, identifying individuals is difficult because fingerprints
collected from confiscated weaponry of the pirates cannot be matched to

200. Barry H. Dubner & Sara Fredrickson, On the Legal Issues Regarding the Prosecution of Sea
Pirates (Including Human Rights): A Case of History Repeating Itself?, 26 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J.
233, 254 (2012).
201. Id.
202. Id.at 252.
203. Eur, Convention on Human Rights § I arts. 3, 5, 6; Protocol No. 6 arts. 1,2 (June 1, 2010),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ConventionENG.pdf.
204. See id.
205. See generally id.
206. Paul Hallwood & Thomas J.Miceli, The Law and Economics of International Cooperation
Against Maritime Piracy, U. CONN. DEP'T ECON. WORKING PAPER SERIES (June 2011).

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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any database. 2'0 Finally, interviews are also problematic because it can be
unclear whether the information gathered was via interrogation without
proper legal procedure or through voluntary statements.2 1
The fourth edition of the Best Management Practices directives was
created to instruct on post-incident evidence preservation and collection.212
"Consistency" and "uniformity" were the main objects of having
specialized courts in the local regional Station.
The total cost of prosecuting pirates has been set forth in this article. It
is exorbitant. Much of the cost is spent on expenses in setting up trials and
training personnel. "Regionalism" is an excellent idea for both cost and
human rights reasons. It is much cheaper to try pirates in the local area of
Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Mauritius then it is to fly them back to
Europe.
V. CONCLUSION

Nations that bring pirates back to their homelands run the risk of not
following their procedures, which leads the ECHR to release them. The
pirates face the risk of death because states may not be willing to go
through the expense of bringing them back to their jurisdiction only to
have them go free due to human rights violations, as pirates are not treated
as enemy combatants.
As was shown earlier, as of 2013, the World Bank estimated the
economic cost of piracy off the coast of Somalia at $18 billion. This cost is
acting as a "hidden tax on world trade" and this does not even take into
account losses to the tourism and fishery industries.213
Even with the use of regional courts, your authors suggest the
supplemental use of a U.N. flagged vessel; going out on circuit and
hosting trials. This would avoid, for example, the procedural violations of
due process, timeliness, and other rights violations. The holdings of the
ECHR, the Mauritius court, and Danish court demonstrated the need for
"promptness" of the trials for the pirates. However, this necessary
requirement is difficult to achieve because of, inter alia, distances, timing,
witness' availability, and evidence. It is suggested that regional court trials

210.

Id.

211.

Id.
at 8.

212. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Somali
59, U.N. Doc. S/2011/662 (Oct. 25, 2011) [hereinafter U.N.
Natural Resources and Waters,

Secretary General Somali Report].
213. Maritime Piracy, Part I: An Overview of Trends, Cost, and Trade-Related Implications,
UNCTAD 14 (2014), availableat http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtltlb2013dlen.pdf.
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and, where necessary, trials on a U.N. flagged vessel going out on circuit,
would help avoid violations of due process that lead to human rights
abuses of alleged pirates.
While the UNODC is busy attempting to build up the infrastructure of
Somalia, the other violations of human rights concern "pirate" fishing and
the dumping of toxic waste by foreign companies off of the 1800-mile
coast. These issues must be addressed as well.
Your authors' fear is that, rather then bringing pirates back to France or
elsewhere for trial, various authorities will not think it is worth their while
to bother with the situation. This is because they will be disturbed by the
fact that these pirates are getting thousands of Euros in compensation after
receiving millions of Euros worth of ransom money. All of this while
seafarers are rotting away waiting to be ransomed. The truth of the matter
is, each civilized country has a system set up to protect the due process of
their citizens, including murderers, rapists, etc. We would hate to think
what would happen if these procedures were not followed. The human
rights of human beings have to be considered.
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APPENDIX II
RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND
215
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Resolutions of United Nations Security Council

East Africa
2125 (2013) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against
vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia]
2077 (2012) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against
vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia]
2020 (2011) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against
vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia]
2015 (2011) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the

18 November 2013
21 November 2012
22 November 2011
24 October 2011

coast of Somalia]

1976 (2011) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of Somalia]
1950 (2010) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against
vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia]
1918 (2010) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against
vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia]
1897 (2009) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against
vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia]
1851 (2008) [on the fight against piracy and armed robbery at
sea off the coast of Somalia]
1846 (2008) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against
vessels in territorial waters and the high seas off the coast of

II April 2011
23 November 2010
27 April 2010
30 November 2009
16 December 2008
2 December 2008

Somalia]

1844 (2008) [on acts of piracy and armed
vessels in territorial waters and the high seas
Somalia]
1838 (2008) [on acts of piracy and armed
vessels in territorial waters and the high seas
Somalia]
1816 (2008) [on acts of piracy and armed
vessels in territorial waters and the high seas
Somalia]

robbery against
off the coast of

20 November 2008

robbery against
off the coast of

7 October 2008

robbery against
off the coast of

2 June 2008

West Africa
2039 (2012) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of the States of the Gulf of Guinea]
2018 (2011) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of the States of the Gulf of Guinea]

29 February 2012
31 October 2011

215. Maritime Piracy Part H: An Overview of the International Legal Framework and of
Multilateral Cooperation to Combat Piracy, UNCTAD 64 (2014), available at

http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtltlb2013d3 en.pdf.
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Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 67/78, oceans and the law of the sea
Resolution 66/231, oceans and the law of the sea
Resolution 65/37B, oceans and the law of the sea
Resolution 65/37A, oceans and the law of the sea
Resolution 64/71, oceans and the law of the sea
Resolution 63/111, oceans and the law of the sea
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18 April 2013
24 December 2011
5 May 2011
7 December 2010
4 December 2009
5 December 2008
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APPENDIX III
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1897216

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Reiterates that it condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed
robbery against vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia;
2. Notes again its concern regarding the findings contained in the 20
November 2008 report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia (S/2008/769,
page 55) that escalating ransom payments and the lack of enforcement of
the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992) are fuelling the
growth of piracy off the coast of Somalia, and calls upon all States to fully
cooperate with the Monitoring Group on Somalia;
3. Renews its call upon States and regional organizations that have the
capacity to do so, to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery
at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution
and international law, by deploying naval vessels, arms and military
aircraft and through seizures and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and
other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting such use;
4. Commends the work of the CGPCS to facilitate coordination in order
to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in
cooperation with the IMO, flag States, and the TFG and urges States and
international organizations to continue to support these efforts;
5. Acknowledges Somalia's rights with respect to offshore natural
resources, including fisheries, in accordance with international law, and
calls upon States and interested organizations, including the IMO, to
provide technical assistance to Somalia, including regional authorities, and
nearby coastal States upon their request to enhance their capacity to ensure
coastal and maritime security, including combating piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the Somali and nearby coastlines, and stresses the
importance of coordination in this regard through the CGPCS;
6. Invites all States and regional organizations fighting piracy off the
coast of Somalia to conclude special agreements or arrangements with
countries willing to take custody of pirates in order to embark law
enforcement officials ("shipriders") from the latter countries, in particular
countries in the region, to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of
persons detained as a result of operations conducted under this resolution

216. S.C. Res. 1897, at 3-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009).
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for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,
provided that the advance consent of the TFG is obtained for the exercise
of third state jurisdiction by shipriders in Somali territorial waters and that
such agreements or arrangements do not prejudice the effective
implementation of the SUA Convention;
7. Encourages Member States to continue to cooperate with the TFG in
the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, notes the primary role of
the TFG in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, and decides
that for a period of twelve months from the date of this resolution to renew
the authorizations as set out in paragraph 10 of Resolution 1846 (2008)
and paragraph 6 of Resolution 1851 (2008) granted to States and regional
organizations cooperating with the TFG in the fight against piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance
notification has been provided by the TFG to the Secretary-General;
8. Affirms that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only
with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or
obligations or responsibilities of Member States under international law,
including any rights or obligations under the Convention, with respect to
any other situation, and underscores in particular that this resolution shall
not be considered as establishing customary international law; and affirms
further that such authorizations have been renewed only following the
receipt of the 2 and 6 November 2009 letters conveying the consent of the
TFG;
9. Affirms that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733
(1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution
1425 (2002) do not apply to weapons and military equipment destined for
the sole use of Member States and regional organizations undertaking
measures in accordance with paragraph 7 above or to supplies of technical
assistance to Somalia solely for the purposes set out in paragraphs 5 above
which have been exempted from those measures in accordance with the
procedure set out in paragraphs 11 (b) and 12 of resolution 1772 (2007);
10. Requests that cooperating States take appropriate steps to ensure
that the activities they undertake pursuant to the authorizations in
paragraph 7 do not have the practical effect of denying or impairing the
right of innocent passage to the ships of any third State;
11. Calls on Member States to assist Somalia, at the request of the TFG
and with notification to the Secretary-General, to strengthen capacity in
Somalia, including regional authorities, to bring to justice those who are
using Somali territory to plan, facilitate, or undertake criminal acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea, and stresses that any measures
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undertaken pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with applicable
international human rights law;
12. Calls upon all States, and in particular flag, port, and coastal States,
States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy and armed
robbery, and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international law
and national legislation, to cooperate in determining jurisdiction, and in
the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for acts of piracy
and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, consistent with applicable
international law including international human rights law, to ensure that
all pirates handed over to judicial authorities are subject to a judicial
process, and to render assistance by, among other actions, providing
disposition and logistics assistance with respect to persons under their
jurisdiction and control, such as victims and witnesses and persons
detained as a result of operations conducted under this resolution;
13. Commends in this context the decision by the CGPCS to establish
an International Trust Fund to support its initiatives and encourages
donors to contribute to it;
14. Urges States parties to the Convention and the SUA Convention to
fully implement their relevant obligations under these Conventions and
customary international law and cooperate with the UNODC, IMO, and
other States and other international organizations to build judicial capacity
for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
15. Welcomes the revisions by the IMO to its recommendations and
guidance on preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against
ships, and urges States, in collaboration with the shipping and insurance
industries, and the IMO, to continue to develop and implement avoidance,
evasion, and defensive best practices and advisories to take when under
attack or when sailing in the waters off the coast of Somalia, and further
urges States to make their citizens and vessels available for forensic
investigation as appropriate at the first port of call immediately following
an act or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from
captivity;
16. Requests States and regional organizations cooperating with the
TFG to inform the Security Council and the Secretary-General within nine
months of the progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the
authorizations provided in paragraph 7 above and further requests all
States contributing through the CGPCS to the fight against piracy off the
coast of Somalia, including Somalia and other States in the region, to
report by the same deadline on their efforts to establish jurisdiction and
cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of piracy;
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17. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council
within 11 months of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation
of this resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
18. Requests the Secretary General of the IMO to brief the Security
Council on the basis of cases brought to his attention by the agreement of
all affected coastal States, and duly taking into account the existing
bilateral and regional cooperative arrangements, on the situation with
respect to piracy and armed robbery;
19. Expresses its intention to review the situation and consider, as
appropriate, renewing the authorizations provided in paragraph 7 above for
additional periods upon the request of the TFG;
20. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

